

Aviation Safety Regulation Review Submission
by
Gary Gaunt, Principal G J Gaunt Consulting Services

Dear Sirs,

In Appendix, A, containing my credentials, I observe that I was able to gain from scratch a CASA AOC, heavy, unrestricted world wide, initially for Challenger and Citation then for Gulfstream and Phenom 100 aircraft in around 100 days, an heretofore unheard of result.

This was closely followed by a contract with China Southern Airlines for initial jet training of their new CPL holders using the Revesco CAR 217 Check and Training organisation to the effect of over 2500 hours per annum in Citation and Phenom aircraft. A Level D simulator has since been introduced.

How was the CASA AOC achieved in such a short a time frame that was generally thought to take 12-24 months, at best, and in what was supposed to be a hostile regulatory environment?

- Contrary to industry perception every page of the application and Revesco COM was written entirely from scratch, it was my third high level AOC in over 40 years.
- I had around me a highly experienced and well-qualified team and who were well respected by CASA.
- The Revesco COM for the CASA AOC was written to the CASA MOS, but modelled around the IS-BAO GCOM, as it was my intention to become an IS-BAO registered operator from the get go.
- CASA staff were highly proactive and enthusiastic partners in the process.
- The IS-BAO process, for which I became the first Australian Stage 1 registrant, was an important element and an integral part of our process.
- I gained Stage 2 registration in Feb 2010.
- I am now operating as an IS-BAO registered auditor.
- This AOC result brought a commendation from CASA “that it was the best AOC application they had seen” including some recent major airline applications.
- It was a CASA, IS-BAO and Revesco team effort.
- Two words, mutual, trust and respect.

So what is all the fuss about?

We do not have the time to canvas the history in its entirety, except to signal some dot points, which I believe are germane.

- ✚ The core of the Australian prescriptive regulatory suite and underlying philosophy was inherited from our “motherland” the UK.
- ✚ This postcolonial heritage has been haunting the regulatory halls since.
- ✚ QF was pre war still buying DH Dragon Rapide’s when the rest of the world was flying DC2 aircraft.

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- ✚ Australian had a Foreign Exchange problem with a strong \$US with our only export industry being wheat and sheep.
- ✚ We did not then have the current massive export oil, gas and mining industry.
- ✚ The UK was massively subsidising their aviation industry and funding Commonwealth and Dominion purchases through their EXIM Bank.
- ✚ Qantas/Ansett/TAA wanted to buy B707, Caravelle and Lockheed Electra for their operating and cost efficiency, the Government wanted them to buy the British DH Comet, Vanguard and Viscount due to foreign exchange and EXIM Bank benefits.
- ✚ The airlines won the argument and received permission to purchase the US product.
- ✚ However the Federal Government in 1950 legislated the Two Airline domestic policy (Ansett and TAA Government owned), which placed a blanket restriction on the commercial operation of any aircraft over 5700kg to the two Government licensed airlines.
- ✚ This was a necessary protectionist policy in the small Australian market.
- ✚ There were many unintended consequences of this action.
- ✚ The regulatory focus therefore was, not unexpectedly on the aforementioned regulatory method for airline fare-paying passenger.
- ✚ GA was defined as anything that was not airline, but for the lack of a more comprehensive regulatory suite was brought under the same scrutiny as if it was.
- ✚ One of which was the unheard of and bitterly resisted Single Pilot Command Multi Engine IFR Rating. The regulations at the time did not have any IFR Command provisions other than for multicrew IFR airline operations.
- ✚ Thus from 1950 the Australian general aviation industry was cut off from the real world regulatory mainstream and the evolution of what has become FAR's Part 23 against Part 25. That is, the regulator was for regulating airlines (Part 25) and all that brings and was blind to the intentions of the different levels of certification generally accepted in North America and the UK.
- ✚ This had the effect of locking the Australian GA business in its entirety, private and air charter (it was really air-taxi) into Part 23 types. Vis a vis Cessna 400 series, Piper Navajo. Beechcraft Baron/Queen/King Air and so on.
- ✚ The regulators main focus then as now was on airline style operations maintenance and regulation.
- ✚ Further the regulator at the flying operations and airworthiness levels were mostly staffed by ex military and Cathay personnel. There was at almost all levels a complete lack of understanding of civil operational and financial imperatives. This does not reflect any lack of proficiency of the military and airlines just an almost total disconnect from civil GA.

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- ✚ The regulations as related to GA strongly reflected this making no provision for non-airline/fare paying passengers operation. Cessna 172 and on, basically coming under the same requirements as airline aircraft.
- ✚ There was also a strong regulatory bias against the US and any other system. Australians are deeply afflicted with the “Not invented here” (NIH) syndrome.
- ✚ To this day the philosophy, certification and safety differences between Parts 23 and 25 is not well understood, if at all, in the private and commercial industry, including by many in the Regulator.
- ✚ Until very recently the only reference in the Regulations to FARs Part 23 and 25, difference was a small section in CAO20.7.1b which refers only to take off gradient requirements for turbine aircraft MTOW >5700kgs.
- ✚ It is this confusion in Australian between philosophy and intent of the Parts 23/25, which is driving the regulator to treat private operations in the same manner as fare-paying passenger operations and try and make Part 23 aircraft, behave like Part 25.
- ✚ It is this disconnect and the potential liabilities in the absence of a CASA brief or any public information on the issue that prompted me to write a brief explanation available for my intending passengers explaining as simply as possible the difference. It is at Appendix “B”
- ✚ Part 91, 119, 135 and 121 are now only beginning to be understood as part of a whole ICAO FAA/TransCan/CAA suite and the CASA cherry picking is beginning to slow.
- ✚ The regulatory “acrobatics” required to shoehorn these concepts into the existing regulatory suite are the main cause of the delay and confusion.
- ✚ The Australian Regulatory reform program has stalled because of the impossibility of trying to reform our regulatory suite within an out-dated, irrelevant and improperly constructed paradigm.
- ✚ It is time for a fresh start.
- ✚ In brief there is still a great deal of confusion on the philosophy of the difference between the “informed” and “non-informed+ passenger, which in its original form could be framed generally by Part 23 and Part 25 aircraft regulations.
- ✚ CASA on the one hand say they are focussing on the safety of “non-informed” fare paying airline passengers, yet regulate “informed” private operations in the same manner as airlines.
- ✚ This has had devastating effects on the costs of use of private, recreational and business aircraft.
- ✚ The AOPA submission will be addressing this issue in more detail. I am a Past VP of AOPA.
- ✚ I am a Past VP and Secretary of the JACC (Jandakot Airport Chamber of Commerce) and currently their principal technical adviser

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Where to from here.

Directly addressing the principal objectives of the review.

ASR Objective 1 the structures, effectiveness and processes of all agencies involved in aviation safety;

- ✚ Australian regulation is a product of post war proscriptive regulation and the Two Airline Policy not repealed until the 1990's. This hopelessly skewed the development of General Aviation by effectively prohibiting to them the commercial operation of Part 25 aircraft. The entire regulatory suite was built around airline operations and its higher order complexity.
- ✚ The underlying philosophy and clear definition of what is an “informed” and a “non-informed” passenger is, and therefore the level of regulation and surveillance required, is not well understood and requires stronger definition and appropriate regulatory implementation.
- ✚ The UK CAA provides a clear understanding;
- ✚ General Aviation, Business Aviation; and Commercial Air Transport / Public Transport.
- ✚ General Aviation
General Aviation activities encompass private flying, Aerial Work and recreational flying involving all types of aircraft.
- ✚ Business Aviation
Business Aviation (also called Corporate Aviation) is where companies or organisations operate aircraft but do not carry fare-paying passengers. Business aircraft operators do not hold an Air Operators' Certificate (AOC).
- ✚ Commercial Air Transport / Public Transport
Commercial Air Transport or Public Transport activities are those for which passengers pay a fare, or payment is made for cargo to be carried. If a passenger is asked to contribute in any way towards the costs of a flight, “valuable consideration”, the flight is likely to be for the purpose of public transport.
- ✚ Some exceptions to this rule are:
Some flights conducted to raise money for charities,
Some flights where costs are shared between the pilot and up to three passengers,
Some flights where the passengers are joint owners of the aircraft.

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- ✚ Please Note: The term “valuable consideration” can include methods of payment other than money, for example: free advertising or payment in kind.
- ✚ Companies or individuals wishing to carry fare-paying passengers must hold an Air Operator Certificate (AOC).
- ✚ An AOC is required for any Commercial Air Transport / Public Transport flight.

Note the absence of MTOW as the regulatory criterion for the carriage of “non-informed” fare-paying passengers.

Excerpts from the UK CAA.

[UK Government response to Red Tape Challenge](#)

In the UK Special Minister of State Minister Schapps had this to say about General Aviation, very much mirroring the sound and sensible approach taken by Warren Truss.

☒ _General aviation is a crucial part of the UK’s aviation sector. It trains the next generation of pilots and engineers, supports highly skilled jobs, provides essential services and forms a key part of our cultural heritage. The UK enjoys an enviable reputation as a place of excellence in aviation. However, in order to flourish the sector needs a proportionate and supportive regulatory environment.

☒ _The results of the General Aviation Red Tape Challenge demonstrate that we are not meeting this aim. Regulation often appears too prescriptive, impractical and inappropriate for the general aviation sector. Every member of the general aviation community recognises the need for good airmanship and adequate safety standards but regulation should always be proportionate to the risks. Safety regulation should therefore impose the minimum necessary burden and empower individuals to make responsible decisions to secure acceptable safety outcomes.

☒ _The package of measures we have agreed will overhaul the GA regulatory framework, moving it from a prescriptive, bureaucratic regime to a light-touch, proportionate system. Alongside the detailed programme of reform the CAA is introducing changes to its structure to create a free-standing GA unit which will be in place from April 2014, reflecting the fact that GA needs a different, lighter touch approach to safety regulation than the commercial aviation sector.

☒ _The UK Department for Transport will scrap or improve 58% of the regulations in scope.

One of the key changes will be the setting up of a new GA Unit within the CAA dedicated to more proportionate, effective regulation that supports and encourages a dynamic GA sector for the UK. The unit will be in place by April 2014.

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Transport Canada has a clear distinction between “airlines” and others with an accent on publicly available information on standards on the manner of the UK CAA

The FAA has safety, regulatory and safety information clearly available to the public.

- ✚ In Australia a private Cessna 172 is required to operate under similar licensing, surveillance, maintenance systems and regulation as a B747.
- ✚ Root and Branch reform is required to put the whole process back on the rails.
- ✚ We should use tried and effective systems and not reinvent the wheel.
- ✚ By following a North American model or the later UK CAA model after the Red Tape Challenge with, the setting up of a new GA Unit within CASA dedicated to more proportionate, effective regulation that supports and encourages a dynamic GA sector for the Australia, substantial savings can be made in the funding of CASA coupled with a significant improvement in safety.

Everybody wins.

- ✚ The relationship between CASA and the ATSB must be reviewed as in manner of the US, Canadian and UK examples. The current efforts of the ATSB and the behavior of CASA in this regard are nothing short of disgraceful as the recent Senate Enquiry revealed.
A recent confidential ATSB report made by myself after grounding the aircraft due to a serious loss of control event after maintenance evoked a telephone call within hours from the local CASA AWI, a former employee of the MRO, demanding access to the MRO engineer and pilots. Unacceptable under any circumstances.
- ✚ In summary a revised suite of transport category regulations for all operators carrying non-informed fare paying passengers and proportionate “GA light touch regulation for the informed non fare paying passenger.

What We Can Learn From This

A clear direction from government recognising that the GA fleet of aircraft vastly outnumbered the airline fleet (95% GA in the UK) and in order to flourish the sector needs a proportionate and supportive regulatory environment. The comparable numbers in Australia are:

Total Australian aircraft registered: 15,167

Airlines aircraft: 478

GA % of aircraft in Australia 97%

Source: CASA Aircraft Register

Following an EASA approach is overly burdensome for GA.

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ASR Objective 2 the relationship and interaction of those agencies with each other, as well as with the Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure);

- ✚ The 27 recommendations of the Senate Report into the Norfolk Island Ditching provide the evidence of the systemic dysfunction.
- ✚ Department of Infrastructure and Regional Development (Infrastructure) has been found wanting in the appropriate oversight of CASA and the ATSB and of equal importance the administration of the Commonwealth Leases on the Primary and Secondary Airports around Australia.
- ✚ Master Plans when reviewed and approved by DOTARS have allowed the real estate developer owners to effectively cut off future airport expansion.
- ✚ The existing airport structure in this country is limited and extremely valuable, already circumscribed by urban and industrial development without appropriate room for expansion or new construction within a reasonable distance.
- ✚ JACC using quiet advocacy by the President and myself with the Commonwealth Government, we were at some cost successful in rebuffing a determined attempt by the current owners to relocate the airport to an unsuitable remote location and use the airport land for real estate development.
- ✚ The then current Minister Vaile strongly reaffirmed the requirement for all airport leaseholders to operate their airport leases as airports not real estate developments.
- ✚ Appendix "C" Letter from Minister Vaile, sets out the problem and result.

✚ **ASR Objective 3** the outcomes and direction of the regulatory reform process being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA);

We have had over 20 years of reform which in spite of good intentions has created uncertainty and confusion within the GA community.

- ✚ The Standards Consultation Committees have failed because they are committees. Riven by the usual turf wars, factions and unrepentant personalities all "steered" to the result the regulator wanted in the first place. This must be replaced in the manner of the UK Red Tape Challenge and "GA" totally separated from non-informed fare paying transport category operations.
- ✚ For example the US equivalent of Part 61 covers 100 pages, the proposed Australian "equivalent" over 800 pages.

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- ✚ In the US Congress and the FAA has been instructed to review Part 23 and simplify maintenance; we appear to be on the road to further complicate maintenance.
- ✚ Does our NIH syndrome improve safety? NO!
- ✚ Does our NIH syndrome increase our costs and make us less competitive globally. YES!
- ✚ ASR Objective 4 the suitability of Australia's aviation safety related regulations when benchmarked against comparable overseas jurisdictions;
- ✚ We need regulations that reflect the world's most common practice in General Aviation.
- ✚ We need to follow the practices that originate from North America and take heed of the results of the UK CAA Red Tape Challenge, where a more appropriate GA system exists or is being addressed.
- ✚ It would make sense to take a leaf out of New Zealand's book and implement a system that recognizes the size and sparcity of the country.
- ✚ US Perspective
 - ☑ _President Obama has signed into law the Small Airplane Revitalization Act, a measure that is designed to streamline certification of new aircraft and simplify the modification of existing aircraft. The new law directs the FAA to change Part 23 by the end of 2015 to create "twice the safety at half the cost" in terms of certifying new aircraft and, just as important, adding modern avionics and other equipment to the current fleet. "Reforming the way the FAA certifies aircraft can help more pilots fly more safely while lowering their costs; and that's exactly the kind of support general aviation needs to thrive" said AOPA USA President Mark Baker.
 - ☑ _"Reworking the rules is still in process and there's work to do but the law to impose the deadline is a milestone". The cost of certifying new safety equipment and new airframes has prevented many owners from upgrading their existing aircraft or from being able to even consider the purchase of a new aircraft," said Rob Hackman, AOPA USA Vice President of regulatory affairs. "The changes won't happen right away, but this law emphasizes how important it is to keep reforms moving forward. We'll keep working with Congress, the FAA, and the GA industry to make sure general aviation sees the benefits of reform."

What We Can Learn From This

- ☑ _A clear direction from government to redefine what is "GA" and what is not, improve safety and reduce costs. Create "twice the safety at half the cost"
- ☑ _A rigid time frame with a deadline locked in by law to force reform implementation.

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ASR Objective 5 any other safety related matters.

- ✚ Since the 1997 privatization of Primary, Secondary and Regional airport leases, many airport leaseholders have placed more focus on commercial development at the expense of aviation. Kin the doing so has increased the level of hazard and commercial pressure on pilots and operators alike.
- ✚ This is in contravention of the Airports Act 1997, which clearly states the primacy of aviation activities.
- ✚ Many airports including Jandakot have their future airside expansion limited by excessive commercial development.
- ✚ Government must review Master Plans based on a 50-75 year projection of aviation traffic growth rather than the current 4-year Master Plan review with only a 20-year traffic projection.
- ✚ In reality this means a freeze on ALL future commercial development, as most Capital Cities are unable to accommodate new green field airport development.
- ✚ More severe planning restrictions around airport zones must be encouraged to improve safety.
- ✚ There are a large number of aircraft charter brokers using very sophisticated websites holding out as air charter operators, when clearly they are not the holder of an AOC for the type of aircraft offered, neither is the client/passenger made aware that their requirement is being brokered to an operator who may or may not have the appropriate CASA AOC.
- ✚ A Google of key words jet, charter, Australia,
- ✚ The Platinum Jet Management, Challenger accident revealed the US broking business in its entirety. The FAA were quick to react and reinvoke existing legislation on “holding out” and require brokers to reveal the identity of the operator and all of their dba”s to the user. Further they must on their website advise that they are brokers and not operators.

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- ✚ CASA do not seem to be concerned at this practise in Australia nor have learned the lessons from thus seminal accident.
- ✚ Further, apart from being able to confirm the fact that an operator holds an AOC, if you know its operating name, it is now not possible to find the associated OPSPEC that defines the aircraft type and geographical locations within which the operator can fly.
- ✚ CASA response to my many queries on this matter is that the lack of OPSSPEC is for “privacy” reasons.
- ✚ **And there it is right there a fundamental misunderstanding of the CASA safety role in relation to the public.**
- ✚ Although there is an NRPM 1304OS extant, currently CASA Aerial Work category allows Medical Evacuation operations to be conducted to “informed” passenger regulations.
- ✚ I have conducted many such operations.
- ✚ Clearly a patient, conscious or not, is in no condition to satisfy him or herself of the appropriateness of the form of transport, so must fall into the “non-informed” fare paying passenger transport regulations.
- ✚ The point may be moot in regard to the patient being “fare paying”, however I believe properly briefed and tested in an court it would be found he or she were effectively so, as the air ambulance company is being paid for the service, albeit maybe by a 3rd party. It is my strong belief that Aerial Ambulance and similar activities where the passenger/patient cannot be offered a choice should be carried out to fare paying passenger transport category standards
- ✚ The industry at large has as a result become very weary of the process and lost interest. CASA just is not listening.
- ✚ The current mode seems to be if the CASA regulation is not working, instead of fixing it another regulation is written to “clarify” it. Regulation on regulation does not enhance the safety result.

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- ✚ Further as a result of regulating without a clear road map and understanding of the non-inform v informed intent and result, “interpretation” of a single regulation often requires literally a treasure hunt through the Act, CAR, CASR, CAAP, CAO, MOS and sometimes non black letter legislated CASA “policy”.
- ✚ A visit to the TransCAN, UK CAA and FAA regulatory website reveals a clear and simple regulatory suite that even the unsophisticated public viewer can navigate.
- ✚ CASA do not seem to understand that their basic role is the light rein regulation of the “informed” GA sector as defined by the UK CAA and the separation of this role from their more important obligation as the “protector” of the non informed fare-paying passenger regardless of the MTOW of the aircraft.
- ✚ One example is the register of Operators AOC on their website, it used to but does not now show both the AOC details of the operator but the OpSpec. The OpSpec has been removed for “privacy” considerations, thus removing the ability of the public to be informed whether the operator is in fact licensed to operate the aircraft offered.

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In conclusion:

This submission is not intended to be exhaustive and I hope it has provided a perspective from my experience in the "GA" industry over the last 40 odd years.

Not unlike the curates egg it has been good in parts and otherwise quite awful.....



Bishop: "I'm afraid you've got a bad egg, Mr. Jones"; Curate: "Oh, no, my Lord, I assure you that parts of it are excellent!"

"True Humility" by [George du Maurier](#), originally published in *Punch*, 1895.

Having devoted a lifetime to this business, I expect it will be the last opportunity to see this get done.

Earlier this year a Senate report into Aviation Accident Investigations highlighted a range of issues with the regulation and governance of aviation safety within Australia.

It is therefore timely to consider future aviation safety structures and regulatory development approaches and processes in Australia by evaluating the effectiveness of the current approach, looking at international experience and possible options for future improvements and bearing in mind the commitment of the Australian Government to reduce the burden of regulation on the economy.

We must give this industry back to its real owners, those who have built it and know best how to fix it. Regulation must be proportionate.

Overall there is a great deal of work to be done

I thank and I am grateful to you all for taking the time out your lives to participate in this review I remain available for any assistance you may require and look forward to continuing the review through the following months to fruition.

Warm Regards

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Appendix A: My credentials;

- ❖ Murchison Air Services formed 1966 as Operations Director,
- ❖ A pioneer Charter and Reg. 203 (Airline exemption) Commuter airlines, 23 ports around the Pilbara, Gascoigne, Goldfields and the South West.
- ❖ 25 mostly new Piper Navajo, C400 series, Islanders and Cessna aircraft.
- ❖ Final roster of 60 pilots and engineers, 5 bases throughout WA,
- ❖ Servicing the construction of the NW oil and gas and iron ore mining business. Built the in 1969 the first dedicated FBO hangar facility at Perth Airport
- ❖ Until that time charter was conducted in converted WWII aircraft, Anson, Auster and some early, Cessna, Beech and Piper aircraft.
- ❖ We had to invent the modern aviation business model and assist the then DCA (Dept. of Civil Aviation) to accommodate a new industry using modern, all metal, full IFR, radar equipped twin engine aircraft, inside a set of regulations designed for Dragon Rapide and DC3 and other early piston engine airline aircraft.
- ❖ These modern twin aircraft outperformed and were better equipped the then airline equipment.
- ❖ The regulator was struggling to accommodate the modern equipment in terms of performance and maintenance regulations designed for a former era.
- ❖ The airlines were struggling to meet the new demand for the sophisticated aviation requirements of the North American, oil, gas, mining and construction businesses, transitioning from DC3 thru Fokker 27 to F28 in a very short period of less than 5 years.
- ❖ We were struggling with both to service the demand, with major contracts servicing Bechtel, Shell, MKMO, Thiess, Schlumberger, Kaiser, KBR, et al.
- ❖ It was an exciting period with everyone working together to satisfy his or her respective needs. We sold the company into what is now SkyWest (then a much smaller company than Murchison) in 1972.
- ❖ After a period overseas with Belgian Interair in the UK and Europe as the Director of Operations, using their B707 and DC8 equipment in the inclusive tour business between Australia Asia and Europe.
- ❖ I returned in 1979 to spend the next 15 years in the new piston and Citation jet aircraft sales business with the Australian Cessna Aircraft Company Distributor Rex Aviation.
- ❖ Appointed in 1988 as Managing Director of premium corporate turbine operator Corporate Air Services (Westwind Aviation P/L) again holding all the major resource industry audits and contracts.
- ❖ Specialised corporate operator reconstruction, aircraft acquisition, recovery, inventory management and disposal for the banking industry.

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- ❖ Tasked as CEO with the building of Revesco Aviation Pty Ltd from a blank sheet of paper in late 2007,
- ❖ In November 2008 I gained an AOC for unrestricted worldwide operations in heavy jets in around 100 days flat and was now prepared for IS-BAO registration.
- ❖ Nov 2008 is also the month the GFC struck, but past experience took us through.
- ❖ Revesco Aviation Pty Ltd is now a mature IS-BAO Stage 2 operator of two fully owned Gulfstream IV, Challenger 600 series, 3 x Citation II and 2 x Phenom 100.
- ❖ The Revesco CAR 217 training organisation provides over 2500hrs and rising, using Citation and Phenom 100 types for initial jet training to CAAC requirements for China Southern Airlines/CAE joint venture. A Level D simulator for Phenom and other advanced training aids were under construction for them when after 7 years I retired from the company

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Appendix “B”

What is an “airline transport category certified aircraft” then?

First, in safety terms all aircraft are not created equal.

Second, contrary to popular opinion, the number of engines and pilots is NOT a measure of relative safety. I.E. it is possible for an aircraft to have two engines and two pilots and be less safe than another two engine two pilot aircraft or even with one of each.

The regulatory authorities around the world have agreed that for reasons of safety and economy there should be two levels of safety and certification for aircraft.

Safe or Safest. The choice is yours read on.

Safe.

The basic or “safe” level is for what are commonly termed “General Aviation” category aircraft that are certified to what is known as Federal Aviation Regulation Part 23 or its equivalent TransCan 523, UK CAA. These are the airworthiness standards for normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter category airplanes. The regulatory upper weight limit for these types is set at 12,500 lbs. or 5,700kgs maximum take-off weight

The underlying regulatory premise for this “safe” category is that the pilots and their passengers are “fully informed” of the higher safety risks involved than is available in the “safest”.

This higher level of risk and assumed informed consent is offset by a lower cost and level of pilot training, aircraft, design, manufacture and operation. Typically these are your Piper, Cessna and Beechcraft piston twins and Piper Cheyenne, Cessna Conquest, Beechcraft King Air and B1900 and Metro Commuter Airline turboprops.

Whilst the B1900 and Metro Commuter turboprops were licensed to operate Commuter services in the US they are now not as the interim enabling legislation has expired. ALL airlines including the Commuters in the US are now required to operate Transport Category aircraft

In simple terms these types are not required to have the performance, redundant systems, structural design and installed power of the “safest” types nor do they, or are they, required to have the ability to operate normally with an engine failed other than in level flight at 5,000 ft. An engine failure during take-off and any other phase of flight is a serious event and potentially life threatening. The manufacturers generally warn the pilot, that continuing a take off into the air with an engine failed, is the least desirable of all other options.

Regardless of the relative skill and level of training of the pilot, he/she

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cannot make an aircraft perform what it is not designed nor required by law to do.

Safest.

The “safest” level is reserved for what are commonly termed “Transport” or airline category aircraft that are certified to what is known as Federal Aviation Regulation Part 25 or its equivalent. These are the airworthiness standards for transport (airline) category airplanes used for the transport of fare paying passengers. The regulatory lower weight limit for these types is set at 12,500 lbs. or 5,700kgs maximum take-off weight. Our fanjet Challenger and fanjet Citation are certified in this category.

The underlying regulatory premise for this “safest” category is that the passengers are “not informed” of the safety risks involved in any category of flight.

In this instance the Government via the Regulator, in the Australian case the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, assumes the burden of risk assessment on behalf of the non-informed public or fare-paying passenger.

Naturally this is set at a much higher level and requires more stringent certification and regulation.

In simple terms these types are required to have two engines, redundant systems the highest practical level of structural design and sufficient installed power to enable the aircraft to operate normally with an engine failed in ALL phases of flight.

The aircraft is designed and has sufficient installed power such that an engine failure during take-off and in any other phase of flight is neither a serious event nor potentially life threatening.

The aircraft design certification and the pilot training ensures that the probability of any single event or combination of events compromising the safe conduct of the flight is as low as is reasonably possible.

Flight crew training (2 pilots in the cockpit) at this level is rigorous and uses the same full motion flight simulators as the airlines to assure that an engine failure or any other non normal event in any phase of flight is dealt with as routinely, calmly and professionally as possible. The pilots can safely train in the simulator for events and combinations of events not possible in the real aircraft and that in all probability they will never see in their entire flying lives, but if they do they are ready for it.

This is only possible in the “safest” or “airline transport category certified aircraft” and that is the only level Revesco chooses to offer.

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Appendix "D"

A short history of Australian airports.

- ✓ Unlike the US and elsewhere all Australian Primary, Secondary and most regional airports were owned, operated and regulated by the Regulator as part of the Commonwealth of Australia National Infrastructure.
- ✓ These are the only airports that service the aviation industry. There are very few private airports.
- ✓ In 1996 the Federal Government sold long-term leases on all of these airports into private ownership with the mandate and requirement for the new owners to operate the airports for the community, as airports, on behalf of the Commonwealth.
- ✓ Any on airport real estate development income was intended only to support and subsidise the primary role of airside operations.
- ✓ The airports are embedded in the urban landscape and without exception the leaseholders have concentrated on the lucrative real estate side at the considerable detriment to airside and aviation operations.
- ✓ Little if any airside development has occurred and rents, landing and parking fees have increased beyond what is reasonable.
- ✓ The owners closing off future expansion opportunities with commercial real estate developments threaten the very usefulness of most of the airports.
- ✓ Australian cities unlike the US or elsewhere do NOT HAVE ANY ALTERNATIVE SECONDARY OR PRIVATE AIRPORTS available to them within a reasonable distance. Perth and other Primary Airports' are hopelessly over capacity and do not tolerate GA operations.
- ✓ The existing Secondary airports were planned post war for future growth and embedded in the long term zoning plans. Additional metropolitan airports are not reasonably possible due to the organic growth around the cities.
- ✓ The secondary airport airside areas have become an increasingly valuable and diminishing resource without radical Government intervention. **All current and future non-airside developments must be frozen to reserve our future.**